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HARMACEUTICAL  COMPANIES HAVE STRONG ECO- 
nomic interests in influencing physician prescrib- 
ing behaviors. They advertise directly to consumers 
and to physicians. Beyond general marketing, 
manufacturers  promote their drugs to physicians through 
“detailing”—sales representatives  (“detailers”)  visiting 
medical offices to persuade physicians to prescribe their 
products. 
By law, pharmacies receive specific information  with 
every prescription,  including  the physician’s name, the 
drug, and the dosage. Pharmacies sell these records to pre- 
scription drug intermediaries (data miners), who use 
advanced computing to analyze prescriber-identified  infor- 
mation (which physicians prescribe what drugs, in what 
dosages, and with what prescribing patterns).  Data miners, 
in turn, lease sophisticated reports to pharmaceutical  com- 
panies to refine detailers’ marketing  tactics, armed with 
knowledge about physician prescribing practices—for 
example, who are high or low prescribers and early or late 
adopters of new drugs. 
Detailing raises vital health policy questions, including 
its effects on clinical decision making (safety, quality, and 
cost) and the patient-physician relationship (privacy and pro- 
fessionalism). Yet private companies claim a First Amend- 
ment right to buy and use prescribing data for product mar- 
keting. The tensions between privacy and commercial speech 
have deep implications for public health regulation. 
 
Commercial Speech: 
The Future of Public Health Regulation 
In 2011, in Sorrell v IMS Health, the Supreme Court struck 
down Vermont’s prescription confidentiality law, which, ab- 
sent the physician’s consent, prohibited the sale of prescriber- 
identifying information as well as the disclosure or use of 
that information  for marketing purposes.1   Justice Kenne- 
dy’s 6-3 majority opinion held that Vermont’s law is sub- 
ject to “heightened  scrutiny” (a demanding  level of judi- 
cial review) because the act restricts speech based on who 
the speaker is (marketers)  and the content of the message 
(prescription  data). 
The First Amendment’s core purpose is to safeguard dis- 
course in social affairs (politics, culture, and religion). For 
 
most of the nation’s history, the Supreme Court said that 
the Constitution  afforded no protection  for commercial 
speech—broadly defined as speech by a commercial enter- 
prise for business purposes. By 1975, when the Court first 
recognized a constitutional  right to market products,  com- 
mercial speech was viewed as “lower-value” expression.2 
The Roberts Court, however, has progressively increased 
protection  for commercial speech, culminating in Sorrell’s 
“heightened  scrutiny,” which is a rigorous standard  of 
review for all “content and speaker-based” speech. 
The standard for reviewing regulation of health informa- 
tion is critically important.  The Court traditionally uses a 
“mid-level” 4-part test laid down in Central Hudson Gas v 
Public Service Commission3: Is the message lawful and non- 
deceptive? Does the state have a “substantial interest” in 
curtailing the speech? Does the regulation “directly 
advance” that interest? Is the regulation “no more exten- 
sive than necessary?” Justice Breyer, dissenting in Sorrell, 
called for an even lower standard  of review reserved for 
“mere economic regulation” that only incidentally affects 
speech. He observed that prescriber information  exists 
only because the state requires reporting those data. Con- 
sequently, Breyer urged judicial deference to reasonable 
legislative judgments. 
The prospect of enhanced judicial scrutiny casts a shadow 
over regulation of health information, including food, drugs, 
alcohol, and tobacco—almost all of which is speaker and 
viewpoint based. In today’s complex informational envi- 
ronment, government restricts the health claims that com- 
panies can make and compels the inclusion of safety warn- 
ings.4 Pharmaceutical companies must provide information 
about a drug’s risks and adverse effects and cannot pro- 
mote off-label use of their products. If the Supreme Court 
uses a heightened standard of review, these public health 
regulations, and more, will be placed at risk. 
A federal court recently found, for example, that the US 
Food and Drug Administration may have violated the First 
Amendment by requiring graphic images on tobacco pack- 
aging. The Supreme Court,  moreover, has already used 
heightened scrutiny to invalidate California’s ban on vio- 
lent video games to deter youth violence.5 
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The Lower-Value Content of Detailing 
Detailer sales calls may benefit some physicians who learn 
useful information and receive generous product samples. 
Yet the source of medical information is vital. Detailers’ pri- 
mary goal is to sell more brand-name products rather than 
to educate physicians by providing objective scientific evi- 
dence. Some physicians may rely on these accounts rather 
than delving into the peer-reviewed medical literature. The 
informational deficits resulting from detailing could pose 
health and safety risks, increase health care costs, and affect 
privacy and professional practice. 
Patient Health and Safety. Although most physicians 
recognize detailers’ self-interest, sales calls significantly 
alter prescribing practices.6  Physicians may prescribe 
medications that are not needed or that are newly mar- 
keted without  an adequate safety record. Detailing, for 
example, increased Vioxx and Baycol prescriptions  before 
these drugs were withdrawn from the market because of 
inordinate safety risks. 
Health Costs. Pharmaceutical companies spend billions 
of dollars on detailing, primarily for brand-name patented 
drugs for which prices are higher. The detailers’ aim is to 
convince physicians to prescribe their products and add them 
to hospital formularies. Generic drug manufacturers, in con- 
trast, engage in far less marketing, leading to an informa- 
tional imbalance that contributes to driving up health care 
costs. Studies point to the savings that would be generated 
by the increased use of generics and suggest ways to incen- 
tivize physicians to prescribe generics.7 
Patient Privacy. Prescriber information is not usually con- 
sidered a privacy concern because patients are not person- 
ally identified. However, theoretically, cross-matching pre- 
scriber information with multiple databases could reveal a 
patient’s identity, although there are no reported instances 
of this occurring.8  Consequently, companies that possess pre- 
scriber records must ensure the privacy and security of po- 
tentially identifiable patient data. 
Professionalism. Because privacy traditionally  safe- 
guards patients rather than health care professionals, pre- 
scriber-identified information is not usually thought of as 
a privacy invasion. Yet sales visits designed to influence treat- 
ment are professionally intrusive, interfering with the patient- 
physician relationship. Although physicians can opt out of 
detailing, the presence of private marketing in physician of- 
fices is common, which could potentially undermine  phy- 
sician objectivity and impartiality. 
 
Regulation in a Post-Sorrell Environment 
Although Sorrell’s heightened scrutiny poses considerable 
challenges, government  could find creative ways to regu- 
late drug detailing. Existing laws in Maine and New Hamp- 
shire probably will be invalidated, but more than 25 addi- 
tional states have proposed detailing regulations. The Court 
offered states pathways to constitutionally viable laws, ironi- 
cally by enacting more systematic restrictions  on pre- 
scriber information. 
Vermont’s law permitted  prescriber information  to be 
disclosed for health care research, compliance, education, 
or law enforcement. The Court said that these broad 
exceptions showed that Vermont was not truly interested 
in protecting privacy. The courts would probably uphold 
future laws if states more uniformly restricted prescriber 
information,  with narrow exceptions such as for health 
care research. 
Even absent strict regulation, states could significantly re- 
duce detailing by informing physicians of their right to opt 
out or by requiring an “opt in,” which would affirmatively 
require physician consent to sales visits. For example, the 
American Medical Association launched its Physician Data 
Restriction Program in 2006 to allow prescribers to opt out 
of having their prescription information shared. 
Rather than restricting the use of prescriber-identified in- 
formation, states could increase the information available 
to physicians. For example, states have supported  “aca- 
demic detailing” or “counterdetailing” to inform physi- 
cians about generic and lower-cost alternatives to brand- 
name pharmaceuticals.  The Supreme Court  views more 
information in the marketplace as constitutionally  prefer- 
able to restricting information. 
Although “more” information may be constitutionally pre- 
ferred, it is nearly impossible for public health agencies to 
match the marketing resources of private businesses. Com- 
panies spend countless billions of dollars to influence con- 
sumer purchasing decisions throughout the marketplace. 
Consequently,  there remains an important  role for public 
health regulation, such as restrictions on marketing poten- 
tially harmful products, disclosure of health and safety risks, 
and instructions  for safe use. 
Whether  the product  is intended  to promote  health 
(vaccines, drugs, or medical devices), poses hidden risks 
(food or alcohol), or is inherently  dangerous  (tobacco), 
government has a solemn responsibility to ensure fair and 
balanced health information rather than leaving consumer 
safety to an unregulated  private market. 
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